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Abstract
We non-parametrically test a general collective consumption model with public
consumption and externalities inside the household. We further propose a novel
approach to model special cases of the general collective model. These special cases
include alternative restrictions on the ￿ sharing rule￿that applies to each household,
and which de￿nes the distribution of the household budget over the household
members. A limiting case is the unitary model. Our application uses data from the
Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS); the panel structure of this data set
allows non-parametric testing of the behavioral models without relying on prefer-
ence homogeneity assumptions across similar individuals. This application includes
test results but also a power analysis for di⁄erent speci￿cations of the collective
consumption model. Our main ￿ndings are that the most general collective model,
together with a large class of special but still fairly general cases, cannot be rejected
by the data, while other restricted versions of the general model, including the uni-
tary alternative, are rejected. Since these tests are entirely non-parametric, this
provides strong evidence in favor of models focusing on intra-household decision-
making.
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Microeconomists are increasingly taking an interest in intra-household decision-making
models. This interest is, inter alia, fed by the methodological argument that individuals,
and not households, have preferences. As a consequence, the standard assumption that a
household consisting of several individuals behaves as if it were a single decision-maker
seems overly restrictive. This methodological argument is supported by the growing
empirical evidence that the standard unitary model indeed does not provide an adequate
description of observed multi-person household behavior (see, e.g., Fortin and Lacroix,
1997, Browning and Chiappori, 1998, and Vermeulen, 2004).
The so-called collective model for household consumption behavior (after Chiap-
pori, 1988, 1992) has become growingly popular for analyzing intra-household decision-
making processes. Apart from the evident point of departure that a household is formed
by individuals with own rational preferences, this collective approach uses the mere as-
sumption that intra-household allocations are Pareto-e¢ cient. Contrary to the unitary
model, the collective model entails empirical restrictions that seem more di¢ cult to re-
ject when tested on multi-person household data (see, again, Fortin and Lacroix, 1997,
Browning and Chiappori, 1998, and Vermeulen, 2004).
One inherent di¢ culty in the usual testing of behavioral models is that they implic-
itly rely on non-veri￿able assumptions concerning the functional structure of preferences
and/or the intra-household bargaining process. Standard parametric tests do not only
check a model￿ s theoretical implications, but also the ad-hoc functional speci￿cation
assumed. A rejection of a behavioral model may thus well be due to ill-speci￿cation.
By de￿nition, non-parametric tests do not assume any functional speci￿cation re-
garding the household consumption process. They directly test the adequacy of a theory
on the raw quantity and price data by means of revealed preferences axioms. Build-
ing further on seminal work of, among others, Afriat (1967), Varian (1982) conceived
a necessary and su¢ cient condition for observed household consumption to be consis-
tent with the unitary model, which is captured in the well-known Generalized Axiom
of Revealed Preference (GARP). Along with parametric restrictions, Chiappori (1988)
derived the non-parametric implications of a collective labor supply model. Still, such
a labor supply setting involves a number of convenient simpli￿cations for the empirical
analyst, such as observability of the individuals￿labor supply and the exclusion of public
consumption within the household.
It is clear that a realistic modeling of the household consumption process should
account for (partial) public consumption of certain commodities (e.g., rent and car use)
and externalities (e.g., related to clothing) within the household. Therefore, Cherchye,
De Rock and Vermeulen (2004) provided a non-parametric characterization of a very
2general collective consumption model.1 Its generality lies in the incorporation of public
consumption and externalities within the household, while it does not require any in-
formation on the intra-household allocation of the observed consumption bundle. This
non-parametric characterization can be viewed as the counterpart of the parametric
characterization of Browning and Chiappori (1998), which equally applies to a general
collective consumption model that includes public consumption and externalities inside
the household.
Non-parametric tests of collective models have been very scarce up to now. Snyder
(2000) tests Chiappori￿ s (1988) labor supply model with egoistic agents and observed
labor supply. Using semi-algebraic theory for quanti￿er elimination, she develops a strict
necessary and su¢ cient test for data consistency with collective rationality. This test,
however, only applies to settings with two observations. Cherchye and Vermeulen (2004)
test unitary and collective models by starting from the respective GARP conditions.
Their collective test procedure ￿rst draws possible, but not observed, intra-household
consumption allocations for each household; for each selected allocation, it subsequently
tests GARP consistency at the level of each individual household member. Conveniently,
this procedure can be applied in settings with T observations (where, possibly, T > 2).
But, again, the study of Cherchye and Vermeulen focuses on the restrictive setting of
labor supply behavior of egoistic individuals.
To the best of our knowledge, general collective models with public goods and/or
externalities have not yet been tested non-parametrically. A ￿rst objective of this paper
is to ￿ll this gap. More speci￿cally, we test the non-parametric necessary and su¢ cient
conditions for general collective rationality derived in Cherchye et alii (2004) on data
that is drawn from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS). The RLMS
is one of the few surveys that enables constructing a very detailed panel of household
consumption. This is of course interesting, since it permits non-parametric tests without
having to assume that preferences are homogenous across similar individuals (or, in the
unitary case, households). Moreover, although our sample covers a time series of only
eight observations, there is enough relative price variation over time to test behavioral
models in a meaningful way.
As for the practical implementation of the general collective rationality restrictions,
it is to be recognized that the basic tests derived in Cherchye et alii may be computa-
tionally burdensome if there are many observations. Still, as we will show, some basic
theoretical insights enable considerable e¢ ciency gains in practical applications. The
derivation and application of e¢ cient testing algorithms constitutes a second objective
of this study.
If the general collective model cannot be rejected, a further step may consist of test-
1While our following analysis concentrates on two-person households, it is worth indicating that
Cherchye et alii also considered the more general case of M-person households (with, possibly, M > 2).
Still, much of our discussion is easily translated towards such a more general setting.
3ing more restrictive versions of the collective model. Evidently, such a more restrictive
model implies a higher probability of rejection. Usually, restrictions to the general col-
lective model are de￿ned with respect to individual preferences or to the observability
of certain intra-household allocations. An example is Chiappori￿ s (1988, 1992) collec-
tive labor supply model with egoistic preferences and observed individual labor. In
the current study, we propose a novel (and more general) approach to model restricted
versions of the general collective model. Speci￿cally, we consider the possibility of in-
cluding alternative positions regarding the ￿ sharing rule￿that applies to each household;
this sharing rule de￿nes the within-household distribution of the household budget, so
re￿ ecting the intra-household bargaining power of the di⁄erent household members.2 In
fact, as we will demonstrate, this approach obtains the unitary model as a special case
of the general model in a rather unexpected manner. A third objective of this paper is
to explore and non-parametrically test plausible but more restrictive alternatives of the
general collective consumption model.
Finally, one potential drawback of a collective consumption model that takes into
account externalities and public consumption inside the household, is that its generality
makes it hardly rejectable. Although Cherchye et alii (2004) established that such
a model can be rejected on the basis of couples￿data when there are at least three
commodities and three observations, the question remains how powerful the theoretical
implications are in real-life empirical applications. Therefore, in addition to the non-
parametric tests, we also include a power analysis of the various speci￿cations of the
collective consumption model. Such an analysis focuses on the probability of detecting
an alternative hypothesis (e.g., based on Becker￿ s (1962) notion of irrational behavior)
to the detriment of the behavioral model under study. See also Bronars (1987), who
introduced power assessment tools for the non-parametric unitary (GARP) condition.
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. In Section 2, we shortly reiterate
the general collective consumption model, and introduce the non-parametric necessity
condition of Cherchye et alii (2004). We also propose some e¢ ciency-enhancing algo-
rithms for practical application of the necessity tests. Section 3 introduces the data
of our empirical exercises, and includes the associated test results for the necessary
collective rationality condition. Section 4 institutes the ￿ sharing rule￿ -based approach
for modeling special cases of the general collective consumption model. Section 5 then
contains the empirical results for alternative speci￿cations of the collective consump-
tion model, with a special focus on the power of the di⁄erent speci￿cations. Section 6
concludes.
2See Browning, Chiappori and Lewbel (2004) for a recent discussion of this sharing rule concept in
a parametric treatment of the collective consumption model.
42. Non-parametric tests of the general collective model
This section presents the general collective consumption model, which includes public
consumption and externalities within the household. It also introduces a necessary
condition for data consistency with the collective rationality condition, and discusses
the (e¢ cient) empirical implementation of the associated necessity tests in practical
applications.
2.1. A necessity condition for collective rationality
A fundamental characteristic of the collective approach to household behavior is that
each individual household member has her or his own rational preferences, which can be
represented by well-behaved individual utility functions. Since our most general collec-
tive consumption model allows for both externalities and public consumption inside the
household, it is not the observed household consumption bundle that generates utility
for the individuals, but rather the usually unobserved intra-household allocation of this
bundle. Let us denote the observed household consumption bundle by q 2 Rn
+, with the
associated price vector p 2 Rn
++. The intra-household allocation of the consumption
bundle of a couple can be expressed as:
q = q1 + q2 + Q;
where qm is the private consumption bundle of household member m (m = 1;2) and
where Q denotes the public consumption bundle within the couple. It is clear that
observed consumption can be used for both private and public consumption (or com-
binations of both). We will denote the set of observed household quantity and price
bundles by S = f(qj;pj);j = 1;:::;Tg. Individual preferences de￿ned over the intra-




j;Qj); m = 1;2:
A second fundamental characteristic of collective household models is the assumption
that intra-household allocations are Pareto-e¢ cient. Given our non-parametric setting
3The fact that we regard monotonously increasing utility functions in principle excludes negative
externalities within the household. Admittedly, this assumption may be restrictive in some instances
(e.g., tobacco consumption). However, its restrictive nature should not be overestimated, especially
within the speci￿c context of a household micro-economy (which di⁄ers substantially from that of
a macro-level economy). Even though a negative externality may be associated with, e.g., tobacco
consumption, the non-smoker￿ s positive valuation of the smoker￿ s utility generated by smoking might
well outweigh that negative externality. In addition, within-household mechanisms may be instituted
that decrease or even eliminate the negative externalities; see, e.g., the widespread practice of smoking
outside in households consisting of smokers as well as non-smokers.
5(with a ￿nite set of observations), this assumption can be more exactly stated as (using
0n for the n-vector of zeroes):
De￿nition 1. A pair of utility functions U1 and U2 provides a collective rationalization




+, and a scalar ￿j 2 R++ such that:
(i) 0n ￿ qm
j ￿ qj;m = 1;2;
































z1 + z2 + zH￿
￿ p0
jqj:
In this de￿nition, the scalars ￿j (j = 1;:::;T) represent the relative bargaining power
(vis-￿-vis individual 1) of household member 2. A greater bargaining power implies,
ceteris paribus, a higher utility level for the corresponding individual. This higher utility
is not necessarily ￿ produced￿by a more favorable own private consumption bundle: it
may also follow from individual 1￿ s private consumption (through externalities) or from
publicly consumed quantities.
Cherchye et alii (2004) (see their Proposition 1; also Chiappori, 1988, for the special
case of household labor supply) established that the above representation of collective
rationality can be decentralized in the following sense. If the intra-household allocation
of each observed household consumption bundle would be known, together with a cor-
responding set of personalized or Lindahl prices, then the general collective model can



















j );j = 1;:::;T
￿
both satisfy the GARP, where ￿i
j and (pj ￿￿i
j) (i = 1;2;H) are the vectors of Lindahl
prices associated with the di⁄erent commodity bundles.4
Unfortunately, the above observability condition is usually not satis￿ed. As shown
in Cherchye et alii (2004) indirect operational necessity and su¢ ciency tests can be
4Note the similarity between the above decentralization result and the well-known decentralization
result in the case of egoistic agents without public consumption; this result forms the theoretical basis
for a great deal of collective rationality tests (see, e.g., Chiappori, 1988, Fortin and Lacroix, 1997, and
Cherchye and Vermeulen, 2004).
6derived that exploit the limited (observable) price-quantity information available. (In
fact, non-observability of the intra-household allocation characteristics implies that these
operational necessary and su¢ ciency condition do not coincide in general.) The starting
point of the necessity test for collective rationality is a set of T directly revealed preferred
sets DRPj (j = 1;:::;T), which are de￿ned as follows:
De￿nition 2. If p0
iqi ￿ p0
iqj then qi 2 DRPj, where DRPj represents the directly
revealed preferred set associated with the bundle qj.
Remark that these DRPj sets are also fundamental to the non-parametric testing
of the unitary model, where the GARP condition should be satis￿ed for the revealed
preferred sets RPj, which are the transitive closures of the DRPj sets (see Varian,
1982). In the collective case, the DRPj sets are used to de￿ne member-speci￿c observable
directly revealed preferred sets (\ DRP
m
j ) and revealed preferred sets (d RP
m
j ):
De￿nition 3. The sets d RP
m
j ￿ fq1;:::;qTg; j 2 f1;:::;Tg and m 2 f1;2g, represent a
collection of observable member-speci￿c revealed preferred sets if
(i) qi 2 DRPj ) qi 2 \ DRP
m
j (m = 1 or 2);
(ii) qi 2 \ DRP
m
j ) (qi 2 d RP
m
j ^ d RP
m
i ￿ d RP
m
j );
(iii) (qi 2 \ DRP
m
j ^ qj 2 d RP
m
i ) ) qi 2 \ DRP
l
j (m;l 2 f1;2g;m 6= l); and
(iv) (p0
iqi ￿ p0
i (qj1 + qj2) ^ qj1 2 d RP
m
i ) ) qi 2 \ DRP
l
j2 (m;l 2 f1;2g;m 6= l):
The intuition of Property (i) is that if a bundle qi was observed when bundle qj was
also available, then the intra-household allocation associated with the former bundle
must be revealed preferred over the latter bundle for at least one of the household
members. Given this, we construct revealed preferred sets that (only) include observed




j . Further, Property
(ii) is simply the transitive closure of the member-speci￿c directly revealed preference
relationship. Property (iii) states that if an individual is indi⁄erent between the bundles
qi and qj (each giving rise to a speci￿c intra-household allocation), then the fact that
qi is observed while qj could also be obtained reveals (in a direct manner) that the
other household member prefers the former bundle to the latter. Finally, Property (iv)
implies that if an individual prefers a bundle qj1 to the bundle qi, while the expenses
associated with bundle qi exceed the expenditures needed to purchase both bundles qj1
and qj2, then the other individual should prefer bundle qi above bundle qj2. Intuitively,
these properties extend the unitary revealed preference concepts by directly exploiting
the Pareto e¢ ciency assumption that underlies the collective approach.
7The necessity test for general collective rationality can now be summarized as fol-
lows:5
Proposition 1. A necessary condition for the existence of utility functions U1 and U2
that provide a CR-2 of the observed set S is that there exists a collection of observable
revealed preferred sets d RP
m
j (m = 1;2); j 2 f1;:::;Tg such that p0
jqj ￿ p0
j (qr1 + qr2)
for all combinations qrm 2 d RP
m
j (m = 1;2) and p0
jqj ￿ p0






The interpretation of the necessary condition complements the above Property (iv):
if household members 1 and 2 prefer respectively qr1 and qr2 over qj, then the choice of
qj can be rationalized only if it cannot be exchanged for the sum of qr1 and qr2. Gen-
erally, three di⁄erent consumption bundles will be involved in the inequality conditions
in Proposition 1. Only two bundles are possible, though, if both members prefer bundle
qr over bundle qj; implying that qj should not be exchangeable for that (single) bundle
qr.
As a ￿nal note, we recall that Cherchye et alii (2004) also introduced a su¢ ciency
condition for data consistency with the collective rationality model. This condition will
be recaptured in Section 4, where we also discuss convergence of the necessity condition
towards the su¢ ciency condition.6
2.2. E¢ cient tests of the necessity condition
The necessity test of the general collective model checks the condition in Proposition 1
for each possible con￿guration of the member-speci￿c revealed preferred sets (which are
by de￿nition consistent with Properties (i) to (iv) in De￿nition 3). More formally, the
necessity test starts from the DRPj sets (j = 1;:::;T), of which each element should be
allocated to at least one member-speci￿c directly revealed preferred set (\ DRP
m
j ; m = 1
or 2). The resulting \ DRP
m
j sets are then used to construct d RP
m
j sets (according to the
properties stated in De￿nition 3). Finally, the necessity condition stated in Proposition
1 should be satis￿ed for at least one con￿guration of possible d RP
m
j sets (m = 1;2 and
j = 1;:::;T) in order not to reject the general collective consumption model.
Given all this, the test potentially implies checking the necessity condition on 3T2
con￿gurations of member-speci￿c revealed preferred sets. This may entail a huge com-
putational burden if there are many observations, which may be problematic even for
present-day computers. We next present a procedure that may considerably enhance
the e¢ ciency of the necessity tests. Essentially, starting from the unitary GARP test,
5We refer to Cherchye et alii (2004) for the proof of this result.
6Cherchye et alii obtain that the necessity condition is su¢ cient for T = 3. Hence, their su¢ ciency
tests become relevant as soon as T ￿ 4, which is the case in our empirical application.
8this procedure constructs mutually independent subsets of observations for which the
necessity condition can be tested separately.7
Unitary GARP testing
As a preliminary step, we recall that the standard (unitary) GARP test starts from
the DRPj sets in De￿nition 2, which subsequently form the basis for constructing the
(unitary) revealed preferred sets RPj (via Warshall￿ s algorithm; see Varian, 1982). The
GARP condition then states that each observation j should be cost minimizing over its
revealed preferred set RPj.
Our e¢ ciency enhancing procedure concentrates on the GARP violating condition
for a couple of observations (i; j) 2 f1; ::: ; Tg ￿ f1; ::: ; Tg, i.e.
i 2 RPj ^ p0
jqj > p0
jqi: (2.1)
If (2.1) is not met, the couple (i;j) cannot be involved (at the level of the individual
household members) in a rejection of the necessity condition for a CR-2 of the data.8
Speci￿cally, in such a case each constellation of the member-speci￿c revealed preferred




j ) will never
imply a violation of the closing condition in Proposition 1 that involves i and j. This
is obtained by noting that i 2 d RP
m
j (m = 1 and/or 2) only if i 2 RPj, which in turn
entails p0
jqj ￿ p0
jqi given that (2.1) is not met.
Trimming
The ￿rst step of the procedure ￿ trims out￿the observations from the original data
set that are ￿ irrelevant￿for the necessity test. Speci￿cally, it uses the above insight to
concentrate exclusively on couples of observations (i;j) that satisfy (2.1). Of course,
given the construction of the member-speci￿c revealed preferred sets, we should also
include the sequence(s) of observations k that lie between i and j (in the sense that
i 2 RPk and k 2 RPj). More generally, for each couple (i;j) 2 f1;:::;Tg￿ f1;:::;Tg we
de￿ne the set
Seq(i;j) = fk j i 2 RPk ^ k 2 RPjg if (2.1),
Seq(i;j) = ; if not (2.1):
It follows from our above argument that we may concentrate on the union of the
sets Seq(i;j); we further refer to that union as Useq. Intuitively, this means focusing
7We programmed all our algorithms (for the necessity as well as the su¢ ciency conditions) in Fortran.
They can be obtained from the authors upon simple request.
8We note that the order of the GARP violating couple (i;j) is relevant. Speci￿cally, the empirical










9on the couples of observations i and j (and the associated ￿ in between￿observations k)
that cannot be rationalized by the unitary model.
In fact, the observations that do not belong to some Seq(i;j) as de￿ned above
become ￿ irrelevant￿for the necessity test. Given the exponential increase of the number
of computations needed to test collective rationality for larger data sets, excluding these
observations may considerably shorten the time needed to come to a verdict. In fact,
GARP consistency of a particular sample means that all observations are ￿ trimmed
out￿by construction. In that case, all observations become ￿ irrelevant￿for the collective
necessity test, meaning that the test itself becomes redundant.
Subset testing
The second step, which we refer to as ￿ subset testing￿ , partitions the (trimmed)
data set Useq into subsets that are mutually independent when testing the necessity
condition. In this context, ￿ mutual independence￿indicates that for any two subsets, say
Useq1 and Useq2 (with
S
l=1;2 Useql ￿ Useq and
T
l=1;2 Useql = ;), we have that Useq1
does not include observations that are implicated in some GARP violation contained
in the subset Useq2, and vice versa. Formally, this means that for each combination of
couples (i1;j1) 2 Useq1￿ Useq1 and (i2;j2) 2 Useq2￿ Useq2 that il;jl = 2 Seq (im;jm)
(l;m 2 f1;2g; l 6= m):
Indeed, a similar argument as before makes that we may restrict to testing the
necessity condition for a CR-2 of the data at the level of the separate subsets rather
than the (unpartitioned) union Useq. Again, this subsetting may considerably reduce
the computational burden of the necessity test, especially when the number of mutually
independent subsets gets large.
To conclude, we remark that the partitioning of Useq can proceed e¢ ciently by
starting from the sets Seq (i;j): Speci￿cally, using the earlier de￿nitions, it can be im-
posed that for any (i1;j1) 2 Useq1￿ Useq1 and (i2;j2) 2 Useq2￿ Useq2 : Seq (i1;j1)
\ Seq (i2;j2) = ;: Evidently, one should then only focus on GARP violating couples
of observations (which satisfy condition (2.1)). As a result, a simple enumeration algo-
rithm, which consecutively considers the di⁄erent violations of the unitary GARP test,
can identify the maximum number of independent subsets of Useq:
3. Empirical application of the necessity tests for collective rationality
This section presents the empirical results for our application of the necessity tests to
data taken from the Russia Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS). Before presenting
these results, we discuss some particularities of the RLMS data set.
103.1. Data
The data are drawn from the RLMS. More speci￿cally, they come from Phase II of
the RLMS, which covers the time period between 1994 and 2003 (Rounds V-XII). The
RLMS contains a lot of socio-economic information like detailed expenditures, incomes,
assets and health from a nationally representative sample of Russian households. It
was designed to measure the impact of Russian reforms on the economic well-being of
households and individuals. Although the RLMS survey design focuses on a longitudinal
study of populations of dwelling units, it allows a panel analysis of those households
remaining in the original dwelling unit over time.
The sample selection for the present study is for couples with no one else in the
household. We select households where both members are employed to mitigate the issue
of the non-separability between consumption and leisure (see Browning and Meghir,
1991). Finally, we only consider households that were observed in all the available
rounds of Phase II of the RLMS. This results in a sample of 148 couples that are 8
times observed.
In our empirical exercises, we focus on a fairly detailed commodity bundle that
consists of 21 nondurable goods: (1) bread, (2) potatoes, (3) vegetables, (4) fruit, (5)
meat, (6) dairy products, (7) fat, (8) sugar, (9) eggs, (10) ￿sh, (11) other food items,
(12) alcohol, (13) tobacco, (14) food outside the home, (15) clothing, (16) car fuel, (17)
wood fuel, (18) gas fuel, (19) luxury goods, (20) services and (21) rent. Although the
disaggregation of food items may appear far too detailed, it should be noted that the
average budget share of food equals 40% for the selected sample (see also the Appendix).
Prices are obtained by averaging recorded prices across the households in a given census
region. Some of the commodities that we use are aggregate commodities. The price
index for a composite commodity is the weighted geometric mean of the prices of the
di⁄erent items in the aggregate good, with weights equal to the average budget shares
in a given census region (i.e., we use the Stone price index). Some summary statistics
for our sample are given in the Appendix.
Anticipating the empirical results, it should be stressed that we apply the non-
parametric collective rationality test to each separate household, which implies that
each household￿ s quantity and price observations form an apart set S. As already
mentioned in the introduction, falsi￿cation of the general collective model requires (at
least) three commodities and three observations. Hence, given that each household is
eight times observed and the commodity bundle consists of more than three goods,
the general collective model is potentially rejectable. Another advantage of testing at
the household level is that we do not need to rely on possibly controversial preference
homogeneity assumptions across individuals in di⁄erent households.
113.2. Empirical results
Table 3.1 summarizes the empirical results for the necessity test of the general collective
consumption model. It is clear from the upper panel of the table, that all couples in
our sample pass the necessity test. From the middle panel, it can deduced that the
consumption behavior of 117 couples, or 79%, can be described by means of a unitary
model. In other words, their set of observed quantity-price bundles satis￿es the GARP
condition. Following our trimming procedure, all eight observations of these households
are irrelevant for the necessity test in the sense described above.
Next, all households that do not pass the GARP test have at least three irrelevant
observations. In fact, most of these households have ￿ve or six irrelevant observations,
which considerably favors the e¢ ciency of the necessity test algorithm. This indicates
that the suggested trimming procedure may considerably enhance the e¢ ciency of the
testing algorithm in practical applications.
The results of the subset testing procedure are given in the bottom panel of Table
3.1. For most households that do not satisfy the GARP, only a single subset can be
created from the original data sets. In such cases, all ￿ relevant￿observations are linked
to each other via revealed preference relationships; which makes a separate analysis of
subsets impossible. For one household, we can distinguish two subsets for which the
necessity conditions can be tested separately. It has ￿ve relevant observations, which
are allocated to subsets with respectively two and three observations. More generally,
one may expect this subset procedure to be particularly useful for larger data sets.
What can we infer from these results? A ￿rst conclusion is that the general col-
lective consumption model seems to provide an adequate description of the observed
consumption behavior of the couples in our sample, at least if the evaluation criterion
is non-rejection of its theoretical implications when tested on real data. The unitary
model￿ s GARP condition, on the other hand, is rejected for about 20% of the households
in our sample. In view of the fact that we only have eight observations per household,
this gives fairly strong evidence in favor of the collective approach. Moreover, we per-
formed the non-parametric tests at the individual household level, which excludes the
interpretation of GARP violations as revealing unobserved heterogeneity.
Another conclusion may be that the theoretical implications of the general collec-
tive consumption model are simply too ￿ generous￿to obtain violations from realistic
data. This alternative interpretation motivates our next section, which discusses how
far we can go in restricting the general model. Our following empirical assessment in
Section 5 also includes a power analysis of the restricted collective consumption model,
which should give a deeper insight into the e⁄ective ￿ generosity￿of the alternative model
speci￿cations.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the following empirical analysis focuses on
su¢ ciency conditions for collective rationality, which naturally complements this ￿rst-
12Table 3.1: Necessity test results
Frequency Percentage
Necessity test
CR-2 rejected 0 0.00
CR-2 not rejected 148 100.00














13step assessment of the necessity conditions. In particular, while the results in Table
3.1 yield the conclusion that we cannot exclude that a collective rationalization of the
data is possible, these further su¢ ciency results will reveal whether or not it is certainly
feasible to de￿ne collective consumption models that rationalize the observed couples￿
behavior.
4. Restricting the general collective model: a new approach
If the general collective model cannot be rejected, one may investigate the extent to
which more restrictive models are equally plausible. This may be an interesting research
question from an empirical point of view. For example, it may examine the validity
of (frequently employed) restrictions with respect to individual preferences or to the
observability of certain intra-household allocations. But such an investigation may
also be interesting from a theoretical perspective. For example, a great deal of the
(parametric) testing and identi￿cation results in the collective literature are derived for
the case of egoistic agents.
This section proposes a novel way to de￿ne restrictions of the general collective
model. Speci￿cally, the restrictions directly constrain the sharing rule that applies
within each household. After introducing some general concepts, we present operational
su¢ cient conditions that enable testing data consistency with collective rationality un-
der alternative speci￿cations of the sharing rule restrictions. As we will indicate, these
su¢ ciency tests actually boil down to verifying the unitary GARP condition on a trans-
formed data set. This suggest the consumption models that underly the su¢ ciency tests
as direct collective extensions of the unitary model.
As a preliminary remark, we recall that Cherchye et alii (2004) argue, for their gen-
eral collective consumption model, the convergence of their empirical necessity restric-
tions towards the su¢ ciency restrictions when T gets large. Of course, that argument
is of limited value here given that our application contains only eight observations for
each evaluated household. Still, it does justify at least to some extent an important
focus on the empirical testing of the su¢ cient collective rationality conditions in our
empirical exercises. In addition, one may generally expect the necessary condition to
converge more rapidly towards the su¢ ciency condition when the range of possible shar-
ing rules is increasingly restricted. In fact, the necessity condition coincides with the
su¢ ciency condition in the limiting case where the sharing rule restriction implies the
latter condition reducing to the unitary GARP condition (see our discussion below).
4.1. Collective rationality under sharing rule restrictions
The philosophy of our approach is that we want to maintain as much as possible the gen-
erality with respect to the structure of individual preferences and the non-observability
14of intra-household allocations. The approach is directly based on the decentralization
result discussed in Section 2, which essentially implies that observed household con-
sumption results from a two-step allocation procedure. In the ￿rst step, individuals
divide the household￿ s total expenditures among each other. In the second step, each
individual allocates her or his expenditure share to the household￿ s decomposed (pri-
vate and public) consumption bundles. An important di⁄erence with respect to the
more usual decentralization result (that applies under egoistic preferences), is that this
(individual) consumption may encompass not only own private consumption, but also
the partner￿ s private consumption and public consumption. Given the assumption of
Pareto-e¢ ciency, this implies that the intra-household allocation process involves Lin-
dahl or personalized prices, which add-up to observed prices. See also our discussion
following De￿nition 1 in Section 2.
Let us denote individual 1￿ s share in the total household expenditures for observation
j as ￿j, which entails the following de￿nition:








j )0 and b qj = (q10
j ;q20
j ;(qj ￿ q1
j ￿ q2
j)0)0.
Individual 1￿ s share thus equals the ratio of that individual￿ s expenditures on the own
consumption bundle, valued at Lindahl prices, to the household￿ s total expenditures.
Since p0
jqj = b p0
jb qj, where b pj = (p0
j;p0
j;p0
j)0, individual 2￿ s share is de￿ned as:
De￿nition 5. The share of individual 2 for observation j equals
(b pj￿￿j)0b qj
p0
jqj = 1 ￿ ￿j.
The rationality condition for the restricted collective consumption models includes
the idea of a ￿ sharing rule￿ , which de￿nes the distribution of household expenditures over
the di⁄erent household members. (This sharing rule may be interpreted as re￿ ecting
the bargaining power of the di⁄erent household members in the household allocation
process; see in particular the duality result in Proposition 3 of Browning, Chiappori
and Lewbel (2004).) A broad class of special cases of the general collective model may
then be de￿ned through restrictions on this sharing rule. The di⁄erent models include
various restrictions on the sharing rule in the form of ￿(p0
jqj) ￿ ￿0
jb qj ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(p0
jqj)
(or, equivalently, ￿(p0
jqj) ￿ (b pj ￿ ￿j)0b qj ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)(p0
jqj)): For example, imagine that
individuals in the household can only survive if they receive an expenditure share that
is at least equal to ￿ 2 [0;0:5]; ￿ can then be literally interpreted as a subsistence share,
but also as a minimum requirement for both individuals which prevents the dissolution
of the couple.
Formally, this class of restrictions can be represented by the following maximization
programme:
15De￿nition 6. For ￿ 2 [0;0:5]; a pair of utility functions U1 and U2 provides an ￿-
restricted collective rationalization (￿-CR-2) of the observed set S if there exist T com-
binations of two vectors q1
j and q2
j, both 2 Rn




j , all 2 Rn
++, such that:
(i) 0n ￿ qm
j ￿ qj; m = 1;2;












for all (z1;z2;zH) 2 (Rn
+)3 with ￿0







for all (z1;z2;zH) 2 (Rn
+)3 with (b pj ￿ ￿j)0b z ￿ (b pj ￿ ￿j)0b qj;
where b z = (z10;z20;zH0)0:
The interpretation is directly analogous to that of De￿nition 1. The mere di⁄erence
is the sharing rule restriction that is included in (iii). As indicated above, such a restric-
tion may be motivated by subsistence or dissolution-preventing arguments in practical
applications. Still, it is worth stressing that it also encompasses a multitude of other
special cases, including the more standard restrictions that are de￿ned with respect to
(possibly egoistic) individual preferences or the observability of certain intra-household
allocations. (Compare with Section 6 in Cherchye et alii (2004), which discusses special
cases of the general collective model.)
More generally, one may use alternative sharing rule restrictions for di⁄erent house-
hold observations, where these restrictions may vary depending on the household and
the speci￿c situation under consideration. We will not explicitly consider such variants
in this study, but our following discussion is easily extended to include such cases. Such
extensions may, e.g., be worthwhile to consider in applications where additional prior
information regarding the intra-household process is available, or when sharing rule
recovery forms a main purpose of the testing exercise.
4.2. Su¢ ciency conditions for collective rationality
Contrary to Section 2, we exclusively focus on su¢ cient collective rationality conditions
in the following. Consistency with the su¢ ciency consistency condition (for particular
￿) means that there certainly exists at least one speci￿cation of the intra-household
allocation that guarantees consistency of observed behavior with collective rationality
16as de￿ned in De￿nition 6.9 Building further on Cherchye et alii (2004), we get the
following su¢ ciency condition for an ￿-CR-2 of the data:10
Proposition 2. A su¢ cient condition for the existence of utility functions U1 and U2
that provide an ￿-CR-2 of the observed set S is that there exists a partitioning N1; N2
(N1 [N2 = f1;:::;Tg; N1 \N2 = ;) with (j 2 N1 ) ￿0
ib qj = ￿p0
iqj 8i 2 f1;:::;Tg) and
(j 2 N2 ) ￿0
ib qj = (1 ￿ ￿)p0
iqj 8i 2 f1;:::;Tg), such that both individual household
members meet the corresponding GARP conditions.
One interpretation of this su¢ ciency condition is that it requires the set S can
be transformed in two sets S1 and S2 that both satisfy GARP. More speci￿cally,
S1 = f(￿jqj;pj); j = 1;:::;Tg and S2 = f((1 ￿ ￿j)qj;pj); j = 1;:::;Tg where ￿j = ￿
if j 2 N1 (i.e., individual 1 receives the share ￿) and ￿j = (1 ￿ ￿) if j 2 N2 (i.e.,
individual 1 receives the share (1 ￿ ￿)). For example, assume that ￿ is equal to 0.3. In
terms of De￿nition 6, this means that each individual member gets at least 30 percent
of the total household means. A su¢ cient condition for such a collective rationalization
to be possible is data consistency with the member-speci￿c GARP conditions when the
two household members receive either 30 or 70 percent of the total household means.
However, the speci￿c value may vary depending on the speci￿c observation. Conse-
quently, for some observations an individual may receive a share of 70 percent, whereas
it may amount to only 30 percent in other situations.
The non-parametric test for an ￿-CR-2 ￿rst transforms the observed consumption
bundles qj (j = 1;:::;T) to ￿jqj and subsequently tests the standard GARP condition
on the resulting sets S1 and S2. The intuition behind the result is that both individuals
should maximize their utility subject to the shares that are allocated to them, and that
their choices should be consistent across the observations, independently of the fact
whether they received the share ￿ or (1 ￿ ￿). Of course, since intra-household allo-
cations are assumed Pareto-e¢ cient, the above requirements should be simultaneously
satis￿ed for both individuals.
A few observations are in order with respect to the ￿-CR-2 restrictions. First,
if ￿ equals 0.5, then the above restricted collective model reduces to the standard
unitary model. If all consumption bundles are multiplied by 0.5, then standard revealed
preference sets are obtained, which are the immediate ingredients for the GARP test.
9One could equally derive a necessity condition for data consistency with the collective model for
particular ￿: The derivation is easily analogous to that of Proposition 3 in Cherchye et alii (2004),
which obtains the necessary rationality condition for the general collective consumption model. Still,
given our main focus on su¢ ciency conditions in the following, we abstract from explicitly including
this result here.
10The explanation following the proposition provides the intuition of the result. A formal proof is
obtained along directly similar lines as the proof of Proposition 4 in Cherchye et alii, which establishes
a su¢ cient rationality condition for the general collective consumption model.
17The unitary model is thus a ￿rst limit case of the ￿-CR-2 model. More generally, this
result implies that if individuals in couples always share the total resources equally,
then this intra-household decision-making process can never be distinguished from the
unitary approach.
A second limit case is the so-called situation-dependent totalitarianism situation,
which is described in Proposition 4 of Cherchye et alii (2004). This model can be
rationalized by setting ￿ equal to zero, implying that an individual either has own
expenditures equal to the household￿ s total resources, or has no own expenditures at
all. This model can also be viewed as an extension of the unitary model. In that
interpretation, the unitary case implies that one household member has the full decision
power within the household: the observed consumption bundle is assumed to result
from the maximization of the preferences of the ￿ totalitarian￿decision-maker subject to
the household budget constraint. The situation-dependent totalitarianism model then
implies two separate decision-makers in a couple. Each of these two decision-makers
is responsible for only a (disjunct) subset of the observed consumption choices in S.
Consequently, the su¢ cient condition for a 0-CR-2 implies that there should exist an
allocation of all observations in a couple￿ s data set to at most two (disjunct) subsets that
individually meet the GARP condition. Note that in this case GARP is to be checked
on a limited number of observations (contained in each subset), whereas in speci￿cations
with ￿ 2 ]0;0:5], the sets S1 and S2 both consist of T observations.
A ￿nal observation concerns the fact that the su¢ ciency collective rationality condi-
tions (in Proposition 2) are generally much easier to test than the necessity conditions (in
Proposition 1). Speci￿cally, they require checking at most 2T alternative speci￿cations
of the sets N1 and N2, which is much below the maximum number of 3T2
con￿gurations
in the necessity tests. Again, further e¢ ciency gains may be realized by various re￿ne-
ments of the testing algorithm (including trimming and subsection testing). For the
sake of compactness, we abstract from a detailed discussion here, but the treatment is
analogous to that in Section 2.11 Also, our own application, including the computation
of the power measures (which imply 1000 iterations for each household and for the dif-
ferent ￿-speci￿cations under consideration), does not utilize such e¢ ciency-enhancing
strategies. Nevertheless, our di⁄erent exercises required little computation time (e.g.,
for a given ￿ the power assessment for the whole sample of all households only took a
couple of minutes for a standard PC con￿guration).
11For example, it is easily veri￿ed that the e¢ ciency enhancing procedures in Section 2 may equally
be applied when testing consistency with the situation-dependent totalitarianism model.
185. Empirical application of the ￿-restricted tests for collective rational-
ity
This section presents the results for ￿-restricted collective rationality tests when applied
to our RLMS data set. As a main focus will be on the power of the alternative collective
rationality models, we ￿rst outline our procedure for the power assessment.12
5.1. Power assessment method
Generally, a power analysis evaluates the probability of detecting an alternative hy-
pothesis to the model under study. Bronars (1987) ￿rst de￿ned power measures for
the unitary model. His alternative hypothesis was based on Becker￿ s (1962) notion of
irrational behavior, which states that households randomly choose consumption bundles
that exhaust the available budget. Bronars￿power measures then capture the proba-
bility of rejecting the GARP condition for such randomly drawn consumption bundles
from the observed budget hyperplanes. Our power assessment basically extends Bronars￿
(unitary) procedure for the collective rationality tests, except from some modi￿cations
that speci￿cally relate to the nature of our RLMS data.
At least two data features impact on the power assessment. First, as Bronars has
illustrated, power measures crucially depend on the degree of relative price variation
in the data. For example, if budget hyperplanes do not intersect for a particular data
set, then the unitary model can never be rejected for this data. Second, and more
speci￿c to our application, the power assessments should account for the presence of
zero expenditures in the data. Generally, this is an important feature of microdata
on detailed consumption, which is a particularly relevant consideration for the RLMS
(where the data for each survey round refer to the consumption in a single week).
It should be noted that our focus on nondurables mitigates the zero expenditure
problem to some extent. In addition, given the relative importance of food in the
Russian consumption, the issue of zero expenditures on detailed food items due to
infrequency of purchase is probably less important than in OECD countries.13 Still, we
do believe it is important to explicitly take up the presence of zero expenditures in our
power assessment. In fact, without explicit correction, randomly drawing commodity
12As we concentrate on su¢ cient conditions for ￿-restricted collective rationality, our power estimates
may also be interpreted as ￿ upper bounds￿for the power of necessary and su¢ cient (￿-restricted) collec-
tive rationality conditions. One could similarly conceive ￿ lower bounds￿power measures starting from
operational necessity conditions for collective rationality. Like before, these lower bounds will lie closer
to the upper bounds for ￿ closer to their maximum value of 0.5.
13Also our evaluation of the collective rationality conditions at the individual household level alleviates
the potential problem of zero expenditures: if there are no expenditures on a given commodity in all
eight rounds, then this household simply has a smaller consumption set than a household that has
expenditures on all the commodities.
19bundles from a household￿ s budget constraint obtains a zero probability of simulating
zero consumption of a certain item. Clearly, such a simulation does not match reality
if zero expenditures are e⁄ectively observed.
Given all this, we use a power assessment procedure that starts from Becker￿ s (1962)
irrational behavior, but takes into account the observed zero expenditures. More specif-
ically, we ￿rst calculate per household h and per commodity i the proportion of strictly
positive expenditures in the eight household observations. Let us denote this proportion
by zhi. The drawings of household-speci￿c irrational commodity bundles then proceeds
as follows. First, per commodity i and per time period t we draw a random number from
the uniform distribution between 0 and 1. If this commodity- and time-speci￿c number
is greater than zhi, then the number vhit is set equal to zero. In the opposite case, the
number vhit is the result of a new drawing from the uniform distribution (between 0
and 1). Subsequently, the budget share whit for household h of commodity i at time t is
de￿ned as (vhit=
P
i vhit). Finally, the random/irrational quantity bundle for household
h at time t is obtained by multiplying the thus obtained vector of budget shares by
the observed expenditure level (of household h at time t), and dividing the di⁄erent
components of the resulting vector by the corresponding components of the observed
commodity price vector (for household h at time t).
For each household and per RLMS-round, 1000 random consumption bundles are
constructed in the way just described. The advantage of the procedure is that it re-
sults in an expected proportion of zero expenditures that complies with the observed
proportion. Moreover, if a household does not have any expenditures on a particular
commodity in all eight rounds of the RLMS, then it will never be randomly allocated a
consumption bundle with strictly positive expenditures on that commodity.
The randomly constructed consumption bundles can now be used to estimate the
power of the rationality tests associated with di⁄erent collective consumption models. A
power measure gives the probability that a particular collective rationality test detects
such irrational (budget-exhausting) behavior.14 Our empirical exercise speci￿cally con-
siders two power measures, which exploit the panel structure of our data set and provide
useful complementary information. The ￿rst measure (labelled Power 1) captures the
proportion of the 1000 random cases where Becker￿ s irrational behavior is detected for
at least one household in the sample. The underlying idea is that a behavioral model
is rejected if not all households can be ￿t in its theoretical implications. However, it is
well possible that an outlier-household completely determines this ￿rst power measure.
Therefore, our second power measure (labelled Power 2) gives the average proportion
of households where Becker￿ s irrational behavior is detected across all (1000) randomly
14Remark that there may be some confusion of tongues when using the notion of irrational behavior.
In our study, we use the term to refer to randomly drawn commodity bundles, and not to household
behavior that cannot be ￿t in the unitary model, which may actually be consistent with a more general
collective speci￿cation.
20drawn scenarios. We may summarize that the Power 1 measure captures the power
of the model at the level of the sample as a whole, while the Power 2 measure pro-
vides complementary information regarding the power of the model at the level of the
individual households.
5.2. Empirical results
Table 5.1 summarizes the test results associated with the ￿-restricted collective con-
sumption models. Before discussing these results in greater detail, recall that our
analysis focuses on su¢ ciency tests for collective rationality. As mentioned before,
consistency with these su¢ ciency conditions for particular ￿ means that there exists
at least one de￿nition of the collective consumption model (corresponding to speci￿c
sharing rule restrictions) that rationalizes the observed behavior.
Table 5.1: Su¢ ciency test results
Model Number of rejections Power 1 Power 2
￿ = 0:5 (unitary model) 31 100 12.64
￿ = 0:495 19 100 8.41
￿ = 0:49 16 100 6.09
￿ = 0:47 5 100 2.81
￿ = 0:45 1 100 1.70
￿ = 0:4 0 100 0.75
￿ = 0:3 0 100 0.21
￿ = 0:2 0 99.70 0.10
￿ = 0:01 0 99.70 0.06
￿ = 0:005 0 99.70 0.06
￿ = 0 (situation-dependent totalitarianism) 0 99.70 0.05
Note: Power measures are in percentages. Power 1 gives the proportion of randomly
drawn data sets for which at least one household does not satisfy the tested condition.
Power 2 gives the average proportion of couples that does not satisfy the tested
condition across the randomly drawn data sets.
A ￿rst observation then pertains to the case where ￿ equals 0.50, which states that
the two members equally divide the household resources under all circumstances. As
discussed before, the empirical implications of this collective model are indistinguishable
from those of the unitary model. Given this, the 31 households that did not pass the
GARP test (see our discussion of the necessity test results) can never meet the empirical
conditions corresponding to this limit case of the collective consumption model. This
21also appears in Table 5.1.
Next, we ￿nd in the table that all couples meet the other (￿ extreme￿ ) situation-
dependent totalitarianism condition (for ￿ = 0). This implies that there certainly exists
a collective rationalization of the data for the general collective consumption model,
which complies with not including sharing rule restrictions. Let us then regard to what
extent this ￿nding alters for alternative sharing rule constraints. Table 5.1 makes clear
that lower ￿ values result in less households not passing the associated rationality tests.
For example, 19 couples do not satisfy the ￿-CR-2 restrictions under ￿ = 0:495 (i.e., the
couple￿ s members control either 49.5 or 50.5% of the total expenditures). This number
steadily decreases towards zero for lower ￿: only a single couple violates the ￿-CR-2
restrictions for ￿ = 0:45; and all households meet the su¢ ciency restrictions when ￿ is
at most 0.40.
These ￿ndings suggest that, even though the de￿nition of the collective consumption
models underlying the respective su¢ cient rationality conditions may seem restrictive
to some, a wide range of such models is e⁄ectively able to describe the observed couples￿
consumption behavior. Interestingly, these favorable test results should not necessarily
be attributed to a low power of the di⁄erent ￿-CR-2 models: the Power 1 values are
close to unity for all the models under evaluation. This indicates that, for random data
sets that are constructed on the basis of Becker￿ s (1962) notion of irrational behavior,
there will (quasi always) be at least one household that violates the collective rationality
restrictions. In our opinion, these high (sample level) power values provide strong
support for our above empirical tests results, which pertain to the (sample level) validity
of alternative speci￿cations of the collective consumption model.
As discussed in the previous subsection, the measure Power 2 reveals to what extent
these high Power 1 values are supported by generally high power at the level of the
individual households. As for this second measure, we ￿nd that the variation across the
di⁄erent collective models is somewhat more pronounced and that, in general, the values
are rather low. For example, the unitary model (i.e., for ￿ = 0:50) is associated with a
Power 2 value of no more than 12.64 percent: on average, about 13% of the couples do
not satisfy the implications when behaving randomly. This percentage further decreases
for smaller ￿-values. For example, when ￿ equals 40 percent, the Power 2 value drops
to only 0.75%, which means that irrational consumption behavior is detected for an
average proportion of less than 1 percent of the households.
Given our speci￿c purpose of testing alternative behavioral models, we attribute a
relatively high weight to the favorable Power 1 results. Indeed, the construction of that
measure directly complies with our practice to conclude data consistency with a behav-
ioral model only if all households simultaneously pass the associated rationality tests.
Still, in some instances the Power 2 results may seem more informative. For example,
generally high power estimates at the level of individual households seem recommend-
able when addressing recovery questions (e.g. regarding the intra-household allocation
22or the preferences of the individual household members) or forecasting issues; see, e.g.,
Varian (1982, 1983) for recovery and forecasting in the (unitary) non-parametric ap-
proach.
From that perspective, it may be interesting to have a look at the possible causes
of the relatively low Power 2 values. One reasonable explanation for these low values
lies in the fact that we have only eight observations per household: we may generally
expect higher power for larger samples. Moreover, we conduct our analysis at the level
of individual households. Parametric applications usually assume that at least part of
the preference parameters are similar across di⁄erent households, which may result in a
higher power to detect alternative hypotheses. Obviously, by its very nature this para-
metric treatment of household heterogeneity is subject to the same risk of speci￿cation
error as the parametric rationality tests themselves. In view of the particular (non-
parametric testing) orientation of the current study, we believe it is recommendable
to abstract from a homogeneity assumption across di⁄erent households, to maximally
avoid speci￿cation errors. This gives our collective rationality tests as much as possible
a genuinely non-parametric interpretation.
6. Summary and conclusions
This paper presents a ￿rst empirical application of non-parametric collective rational-
ity tests that account for public consumption and externalities within the household.
Speci￿cally, starting from the work of Cherchye et alii (2004), we analyzed the col-
lective rationalization of couples that were drawn from the Russia Longitudinal Moni-
toring Survey (RLMS). Interestingly, the panel structure of this data set allows us to
non-parametrically test the collective consumption model without relying on preference
homogeneity assumptions across similar individuals.
First, we conceived an algorithm for testing the necessity conditions for the most
general collective consumption model, which does not put any structure on the public
consumption or the within-household externalities. This algorithm includes a number
of e¢ ciency enhancing procedures that may substantially decrease the computational
burden associated with the necessity tests; these operational re￿nements build on basic
theoretical insights regarding the revealed preference relationships for individual house-
hold members. Application of these tests obtains that collective rationality cannot
be rejected for the RLMS data. In addition, it shows the practical usefulness of the
suggested e¢ ciency enhancing testing strategies.
Next, we have investigated su¢ ciency conditions for collective rationality. We ￿rst
developed a novel non-parametric framework for collective consumption models. This
framework is based on the sharing rule concept, which de￿nes the within-household
distribution of the household means. Interestingly, the framework incorporates a wide
range of special cases of the general collective consumption model (e.g., pertaining to
23observability of the intra-household allocation of some commodities and speci￿c assump-
tions regarding the individual preferences). We then conceived operational su¢ ciency
conditions that enable testing alternative positions regarding the speci￿cation of the
household-speci￿c sharing rules. Interestingly, these su¢ cient conditions for collective
rationality can be conceived as direct extensions of the standard unitary rationality
conditions. Speci￿cally, the associated collective tests imply unitary GARP tests for
simple transformations of the original data set.
Consistency with these su¢ ciency conditions means that there exists at least one
de￿nition of the collective consumption model (corresponding to speci￿c sharing rule
restrictions) that rationalizes the observed behavior. Using this, our empirical investi-
gation obtained that a multitude of collective consumption models is able to describe
the couples￿consumption behavior in the RLMS data. For example, we found that there
certainly exists a collective rationalization of each couple within the data set under the
assumption that each household member is responsible for at least 40 percent of the
total household means. By contrast, we obtained that the unitary model, which is em-
pirically equivalent to assuming that each household member always gets 50 percent of
the total means, is not able to rationalize the observed behavior.
Finally, we have analyzed the power of the alternative speci￿cations of the collective
model (which correspond to di⁄erent sharing rule restrictions). A ￿rst power measure
captures the probability of detecting irrational behavior of at least one household in the
sample. This measure was very close to unity for all collective rationality models that
we evaluated. We conclude that the collective rationality tests are rather powerful at
the sample level, which provides a strong support for our above empirical ￿ndings.
A second, complementary power measure captures the average/expected proportion
of households of which irrational behavior is detected. The values of this measure were
rather low for all model speci￿cations (including the unitary speci￿cation). We believe
this result can at least partly be explained by the availability of only eight observations
per household. In this respect, it is worth noting that our (necessity and su¢ ciency)
tests also apply to larger data sets. Such larger data sets may entail higher power at the
level of individual households (captured by our second power measure). More powerful
tests at the level of individual households may especially be interesting if the ultimate
objective of the analysis is not so much to test data consistency with the behavioral
model (as in this study) but rather to recover more detailed information regarding
the intra-household allocation and member-speci￿c preferences, to subsequently fore-
cast household behavior in new situations. See, e.g., Varian (1982, 1983) and, more
recently, Blundell, Browning and Crawford (2003a,b), for non-parametric recovery and
forecasting tools in the unitary setting.
Apart from increasing the sample size, another potentially fruitful strategy for ob-
taining more powerful collective rationality tests uses more stringent household-speci￿c
sharing rule restrictions (rather than a common restriction for all households, as in
24our study). Such restrictions can, e.g., be conceived on the basis of additional prior
information about the intra-household allocation process. As we indicated, it is easy to
extend the proposed testing tools for such sharing rule restrictions that vary for di⁄erent
households and according to the speci￿c situation at hand.
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Other food 0.017 0.041
Alcohol 0.014 0.041
Tobacco 0.016 0.058
Food outside the home 0.029 0.107
Clothing 0.073 0.158
Car fuel 0.054 0.123
Wood fuel 0.034 0.134
Gas fuel 0.022 0.072
Luxury goods 0.018 0.097
Services 0.191 0.222
Rent 0.146 0.170
Expenditures on nondurables 2578.30 3947.30
Note: Expenditures are in December 2003 Russian rubles per week (1 RUB = 0.03401
USD).
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